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The Geo-Ecological Risks of Oil Investments by China and the 
Global South: The Right to Development Revisited 
 
Joyeeta Gupta,1 Eric Chu2, Kyra Bos3 and Tessel Kuijten4 
 
Abstract: Addressing climate change and keeping global temperature rise within limits requires 
the phasing out of fossil fuels. Since four-fifths of fossil fuel resources that are currently 
available must remain underground (i.e., become stranded resources), nations and private 
investors should be cautious and strategic about investing in new sources, or else run the risk 
of having stranded assets. For emerging economies like China and historic or prospective oil 
investors in the global South (such as Nigeria and Kenya respectively), this raises an important 
question: What are the geo-ecological risks associated with investing in the fossil fuel industry 
by developing countries? This paper examines this question by drawing on theories at the 
nexus of climate change, the right to development, and stranded resources and assets, as well 
as through case studies of the transnationalization of oil politics in China, Nigeria as an OPEC 
country, and Kenya as a prospective oil investor. We first define and comprehensively assess 
the different geo-ecological risks, then argue that investing in fossil fuels today on the grounds 
of the right to development is akin to investing in ‘the emperor’s new clothes’ as the assets are 
expected to devalue quickly. Since most countries of the North will first want to divest their 
potentially stranded assets at the highest possible price, developing countries should be 
cautious about expanding and investing in these ‘hot’ assets as they may imminently bear the 
risks (and costs) of stranded assets. 
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1. Introduction  
Developing countries have long argued that they have a right to development (see section 2.2). 
They claim the right to use fossil fuels as well as invest in oil and gas exploration, production, 
and dissemination technologies to protect energy and resource security. As a result, the 
emerging economy of China has promoted the development of an oil and gas industry that 
operates at a geo-economic and geopolitical level (Amineh and Guang (eds.) 2014; see 3). It is 
a relative newcomer to the oil exploration and export business in comparison to OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries that have been investing in oil 
for decades (see 4). Increasingly, least developed countries (LDC) such as Uganda and 
Tanzania – as well as those that have recently graduated to middle-income country status 
(MDC) such as Ghana and Kenya – are also beginning to explore options for developing their 
newly found oil resources (see 5). Chinese, MDC, and LDC interests are primarily driven by 
the prospect of enhancing their energy security and increasing their economic prosperity as 
OPEC countries have done in the past.  
However, Southern oil investors are relying on an expectation that fossil fuels will not be 
phased out in response to the evolving global agreements to address the problem of climate 
change. They also expect that the demand for fossil fuels will continue to grow, that the price 
of oil will rise, that somehow their economy will not suffer from the impacts of climate 
change, and that their right to development will not be challenged. Investors have failed to 
consider the unpredictable nature of the global negotiations on climate change and the 
uncertainties surrounding future oil extraction controls. For example, Mo (2014) argues that 
China’s oil companies face four risks – geopolitical risks, resource nationalism, business 
competitiveness, and human resources development – but ignores the geo-ecological impacts 
of climate change. Although there has been significant research on designing greenhouse gas 
mitigation measures and other approaches to controlling fossil fuel demand at the global level, 
there has been relatively little scholarship on understanding the supply-side implications of 
fossil fuel reductions, particularly in terms of global equity, geopolitics, and geo-ecological 
risks.  
Against this backdrop, this paper asks: What are the geo-ecological risks of investments in the 
oil and gas sector for developing countries? In order to answer this question, we combine the 
understanding of climate change and its implications for phasing out fossil fuels, the debate 
around the right to development and its implications for who should phase out fossil fuels first, 
and the issue of stranded assets – or the long-term costs of phasing out fossil fuel in our 
theoretical framework (see 2). We then try to understand the different types of risks in the 
Global South, which consists of about 150 countries in different stages of development. We 
draw on examples from three categories of Southern countries: newcomer oil investor 
countries such as the emerging economy of China that also invest in oil resources elsewhere, 
historic oil investors such as middle income countries like Nigeria and other OPEC members, 
and prospective oil investors such as Kenya, which has only just graduated from a least 
developed country (LDC) status to the status of a lower middle income developing economy. 
Although there is no discussion on which of these countries would have a ‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ 
right to development, the policy practice is to accept that LDCs should be assisted in achieving 
economic progress. Figure 1 illustrates the per capita income of these three case study 
countries and compares it against data from the US, UK, and the Netherlands in the global 
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North over the period 1990-2025. As can be seen, the right to development in relation to 
climate change corresponds to the period during which the climate change negotiations have 
taken place, when the per capita income of China, Nigeria and Kenya was significantly lower 
than that of the developed countries.  
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
 
Our evaluation is based on a literature review of the need to phase out fossil fuels, the right to 
development, and theories on stranded resources and stranded assets as applied to the case 
studies on China, Nigeria and Kenya. The Chinese case study draws on secondary data 
collection from the on-going research work by the research team under the Dutch Royal 
Academy of Sciences (KNAW) funded network project of the Joint EPA-IIAS-IWAAS-CASS 
Research Program examining the Geopolitics of Transnationalization of Chinese National Oil 
Companies in different countries world-wide (see Amineh and Guang 2014). The Nigerian 
case study was conducted during a nine-week period of fieldwork in 2015, with a geographical 
focus on the Niger Delta where oil extraction takes place. In total, fifty-eight semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with experts from the global (12), national (26), and local level 
(20), subdivided into government officials (4), civil society actors (24), industry (6), and 
academics (24). Additional interviews were conducted with seventeen members from four 
different local communities experiencing the impact of oil operations in the Niger Delta on a 
daily basis. The Kenya case study was conducted in 2014 and focused on recent oil discoveries 
at the South Lokichar Basin in the northwestern Turkana County. A total of thirty-four semi-
structured interviews were carried out with experts from global (8), regional (East-African) (2), 
national (20), county (2), and local levels (2). These experts can be subdivided into civil 
society actors (14), academic actors (8), government, governmental agency or inter-
governmental organization actors (10), and private sector actors (2). A further 65 local 
community members in Lokichar were interviewed. Experts were identified using ‘purposive 
sampling’ by identifying interviewees following the topic of interest and the snowball method 
(Bryman 2012). 
The nature of the analysis in the three case studies is different because the circumstances are 
different, even though they all focus on oil and gas investments. Each case study brings forth 
different dimensions of the geo-ecological risks. Since energy security, the right to 
development, and climate change are closely related issues, we argue that current 
understandings of geopolitical risks should not just be limited to place- and space-based 
political risks, but should also include evaluations of ecological and economic risks in relation 
to rights (see 6). While much of the existing research focuses on an international relations and 
political economic examination of how national oil companies enhance energy security and 
address resource scarcity, this paper goes beyond to examine the subsequent geo-ecological 
risks in the context of the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (2015) and the United Nations General Assembly’s adoption of the 
Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. Such risks not only apply to latecomers to 
development who are obliged to take new knowledge into account, but can also point to 
opportunities for avoiding the previous mistakes of others. 
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We have two caveats to make here. First, this paper emphasizes risks and not facts. In other 
words, it looks at different literatures, contextual situations, and perceptions to identify 
possible risks for investing countries. Second, it was not possible to only look at states as oil 
and gas extraction is generally undertaken by companies. The nature of the companies in all 
three case studies is different, the venue where they work is different, and their logic and 
structure is different. This is taken into account in the analysis, but the paper focuses on the 
risks for states and not on the risks for companies. 
2. Three Theoretical Storylines: Phasing Out Oil, the Right to 
(Sustainable) Development, and Stranded Resources  
2.1 Introduction 
This section first discusses the current science on the need to phase out fossil fuels such as oil 
and gas (see section 2.2). We then discuss who needs to phase out fossil fuels first under the 
right to (sustainable) development (see section 2.3), and the potential costs of prematurely 
phasing out fossil fuel investments by exploring the concepts of stranded resources and 
stranded assets (see section 2.4). This section thus frames the key issues involved in addressing 
the research question.    
2.2 The Need to Phase Out Fossil Fuels  
Current assessments of global fossil fuel reserves show that approximately one third of oil 
reserves, half of gas reserves, and over 80% of current coal reserves must remain unexploited 
to limit the increase of global mean temperatures to within 2°C above pre-industrial levels 
(Carbon Tracker 2013: 9; IPCC 2014). Geographically, the remaining oil and gas reserves are 
largely concentrated in the Middle East, post-Soviet states, and Africa, while coal reserves are 
largely located in the United States, India, and China (McGlade and Ekins 2015). 
The long-term 2°C stabilization objective was adopted by all parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Conference of the Parties (COP) 
in Copenhagen (COP-15) and Cancun (COP-16). This target has subsequently been modified 
to a 1.5-2°C objective in the Paris Agreement (2015), a legally binding agreement. With 75 
countries having ratified the Paris Agreement, it entered into force on 4 November 2016. The 
long-term objective is part of a legally binding agreement, and all ratifying countries – 
including the US, European Union, Brazil, China, and India – are obliged to work towards it. 
Nigeria and Kenya have signed the agreement but have yet to ratify it. Parties are obliged to 
come up with short-term targets (i.e., Nationally Determined Contributions) and to ratchet 
these up regularly. However, as the short-term targets are included in Annexes, the degree to 
which they are legally binding is disputed (Gupta 2016), though there is no dispute about the 
long-term objective. Hence, the issue is not whether the global community will phase out these 
resources but when and who has to phase out first and who later.  
2.3 The Right to Development, Sustainable Development, and Climate Change 
In relation to the who question, all parties to the Paris Agreement are expected to phase out 
fossil fuel usage, but the Climate Change Convention of 1992 had stated that this should occur 
in stages, with already industrialized countries leading the way. This argument was a 
recognition of the developing countries’ right to development, which they had been arguing for 
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since gaining independence in the post-World War II period as they felt that industrialized 
countries were hampering their growth prospects. For example, countries of the global South 
argued that trade measures espoused by the Bretton Woods system were used as a disguised 
restriction on domestic economic growth. This led to the negotiations on the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) (Schrijver 1995) and later the Right to Development (Kirchmeier 
2006). After decades of negotiations, this right was recognized in 1986 (UNGA 1986).   
The right to development raises a particularly problematic question when applied to climate 
change: Does the right to development – which includes “the exercise of their inalienable right 
to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources” – imply the right to emit GHGs  
(Baer et al., 2008; Gupta and Van Asselt, 2007; Gupta 2014a)? This is contested as “the 
presumed right to emit” is clearly something different from the right to vote, the right to 
receive an education, or the right to enjoy basic civil liberties (UNDP, 2007: 50). At the same 
time, the reality is that current forms of economic and industrial development are necessarily 
accompanied by GHG emissions when they rely on fossil fuels.  
Given the close coupling between economic growth and GHG emissions, the problem of 
climate change was seen in the early 1990s as yet another problem that would affect the global 
South’s right to grow. The UNFCCC in 1992 implicitly recognized the significance of the right 
to development in its preamble (UNFCCC, 1992: Preamble paragraphs 3 and 23, and Article 
4(5)) and promoted the idea that developed countries should reduce their emissions with 
respect to 1990 levels to make space for the legitimate growth interests of the South in the 
Preamble. However, the legally binding portion of the text instead spoke of the right to 
sustainable development (UNFCCC 1992: Article 3).   
Twenty five years later, although the EU has reduced its emissions significantly with respect to 
1990 levels, the US and Canada have had no legally binding quantitative target for between 
1990 and 2020, while Russia, Japan, and New Zealand (in addition to the US and Canada) 
have no targets planned for between 2012 and 2020. This means that there is less ‘space’ for 
the global South to grow using fossil fuels if the Paris Agreement’s long-term objective is to be 
met. At the same time, the growth prospects of some Southern countries are increasingly being 
seen as the reason why the above listed recalcitrant industrialized countries refuse to take far-
reaching action. In this case, it is unclear who is the free rider in international climate change 
negotiations - is it the US because it has not committed to national legally-binding emission 
reduction targets since 1992, or is it China who is trying to catch-up? Furthermore, instead of 
phasing out fossil fuel facilities, many industrialized countries and their multinationals are 
actively searching for new sources of oil and gas, such as in the cases of the US with its recent 
investments in fracking and Canada with its investments in oil sands. It appears that all 
countries want to further develop fossil fuel supplies as they see their development prospects 
directly linked with cheap energy supply. 
However, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) clearly warns of the 
impending risks of climate change and signals the need for significant reductions in emissions 
(IPCC 2014). While there are some recalcitrant industrialized countries, the EU has clearly 
committed to reducing its own emissions by 20% in 2020 and by 40% in 2030, and calls on all 
“developed countries as a group to reduce emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990” 
(EU 2015). If the science, countries like the EU member states, US, China, and India who have 
now ratified the Paris Agreement, and civil society are all effectively promoting a global phase 
out of oil, gas, and other fossil fuels, this inevitably raises the risk of stranded resources and 
stranded assets. 
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2.4 Stranded Resources and Stranded Assets 
A stranded resource is a resource that cannot be used because it is economically expensive to 
extract (Roberts 2006; Khalilpour and Karimi 2011) or lacks commercial viability (Attanasi 
and Freeman 2013). The extraction of stranded resources, such as fossil fuels or trees from 
forests, is limited by national or international regulations in order to combat their impacts on 
climate change and biodiversity. Conversely, a stranded asset is an asset that cannot be used. 
This first requires a contract or infrastructure in place to convert a resource into a marketable 
product (Crew and Kleindorfer 1999), which then suddenly becomes obsolete due to market 
forces or changes in regulation, leading to economic losses (Generation Foundation 2013; 
Crew and Kleindorfer 1999). A stranded asset implies significantly more losses because 
infrastructures enabling the extraction, production, distribution, and consumption of natural 
resources must be prematurely written off or be rendered a liability (Robins 2014; Ansar et al. 
2013; Caldecott and McDaniels 2014; Generation Foundation 2013). Historically, many 
regulated industries – such as public utilities (Roper et al. 2006) and the nuclear sector 
(Briddell 1996; Stern 2010) – have produced stranded assets when the technologies they use 
are no longer permitted. 
Phasing out a stranded asset is more expensive than phasing out a stranded resource, so 
countries that argue in favor of the right to development must also realize that stranded assets 
can imply significant expenses in the long term. Since fossil fuels must be phased out to 
combat climate change, the question is then whether countries should invest in assets with a 
lifetime of eighty years, which can then become stranded a few decades down the road because 
of future regulations?  
There are three types of risks associated with this decision. The first is when the state invests 
and is left with stranded assets. The second is when the domestic private sector invests and 
sues the state for changing the rules. For example, private nuclear power companies in 
Germany are suing the state because of a decision made in 2011 to close down all nuclear 
power plants in the country in response to the Fukushima disaster in Japan (Bernasconi-
Osterwalder and Hoffmann 2012). While in theory the domestic private sector may have less 
power to sue the state in a developing country context – given that these companies often work 
in collaboration with the foreign private sector – there is a clear risk. In this context, the third 
risk is when the foreign private sector invests in this sector and is then protected from state 
policy by international investment laws and rules, which can either lead to policy freezing or to 
large sums of compensation paid to the investing company (Tienhaara 2010). For example, the 
Swedish energy company Vattenfall filed a claim against Germany at the World Bank’s 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) claiming compensation 
(possibly over 700 million euro) for stranded assets attributed to the forced closure of its 
nuclear plants (Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Hoffmann 2012; see Table 2). 
2.5 Implications for the Geo-Ecological Risks of Oil 
This section concludes first that the global community has agreed on a legally binding 1.5-2°C 
long term objective, thus implying that fossil fuels and fossil fuel technologies are destined to 
become obsolete within this century (cf. Princen et al. (eds.) 2015).  
Second, the question of who needs to phase out fossil fuels can be addressed in relation to the 
right to development, which suggests that industrialized countries (and their multinationals 
such as Shell and Tullow Oil) should make space for the legitimate development aspirations of 
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the South, while also allowing developing countries (and, by extension, their multinationals) a 
delayed responsibility for phasing out fossil fuels. However, due to the urgency of addressing 
climate change, there may be a limit to how long Southern countries can argue in favor of a 
delayed responsibility without running major climate impacts. Notable ecological risks include 
the degree to which water resources will affect the prospects for development in developing 
countries (Pahl-Wostl et al. (eds.) 2016). This is why the Climate Treaty (UNFCCC 1992) 
originally recognized the Right to Sustainable Development.  
Third, investors of new oil and gas infrastructure risk long-term lock in and being left with 
stranded assets, whereas upgrading and capital improvement costs associated with older fossil 
fuel infrastructure depreciate over time regardless. In this case, industrialized countries are 
better positioned compared to the global South for phasing out fossil fuels, though developing 
countries also face opportunity costs associated with leaving fossil fuels unexploited. 
Crucially, however, fossil fuels are unequally distributed across space and the process of 
stranding creates unequal burdens on economic development between the global North and 
South. For example, in order to maintain global temperature increases to within 2°C, the 
Middle East would have to abstain from extracting 40% of their oil reserves while China, 
India, and the oil producing countries in Africa would have to forgo between 66% and 85% of 
their reserves (Jakob and Hilaire 2015). The lost revenue from stranding fossil fuel resources – 
which correspond to keeping a total of approximately 11,000 gigatons of carbon emissions 
underground (Jakob and Hilaire 2015) – will likely amount to more than USD 27 trillion 
(Carbon Tracker 2013). At the same time, the impacts of climate change are also calculated to 
be in the trillions of dollars. 
These three implications for geo-ecological risk suggest that the right to development must be 
accompanied by (a) an implementation process that actually enhances development 
opportunities for countries and helps them avoid inappropriate investments that lead to lock-in 
or stranded assets; (b) a requirement to meet the energy security needs of people in the 
country; and (c) a mechanism to ensure countries’ potential for development and ability to 
adapt despite the impacts of climate change. Under these conditions, the right to sustainable 
development as framed by the Climate Convention is possibly more appropriate.  
 
3. Newcomers to Development: The Emerging Economy of China 
3.1 Introduction 
We now turn to assess oil politics in China, an emerging economy. China is a newcomer to 
‘development’. In the 1990s, China’s income was relatively low, but in 2014, the country’s 
population grew to more than 1.3 billion and its gross national income (GNI) was nearly USD 
18 trillion. Despite the fact that China has high emissions today, the cumulative share of China 
over the period 1850-2002 has only been about 7.6% compared to 29.3% of the US. Although 
recent emissions are higher, any equitable sharing of emission responsibilities reduces the need 
for China to do as much as the US (Opschoor 2009; Baer et al. 2008; Dellink et al. 2009). 
While China should change its trajectory of emissions growth and achieve peak emissions 
soon, the US should have peaked a long time ago in accordance to the leadership paradigm. 
Although China and other developing countries can legitimately require the industrialized 
country polluters to take action first, the question is whether this is in fact a risky standpoint 
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given current geo-ecological politics, the behaviour of the US, and the growing risk of climate 
change. The following sections first discuss China’s climate change policy (see 3.2) and its 
foreign policy and investments on oil (see 3.3) before drawing some conclusions. 
3.2 China’s Climate Change Policy 
China’s climate change policy over the last 25 years can be summed up as (a) calling on 
industrialized countries to reduce their GHG emissions; (b) actively asserting its right to 
(sustainable) development; (c) reminding industrialized countries that policy change in 
developing countries is dependent on international technological and financial assistance under 
Article 4.7 of the Climate Convention; and (d) developing implicit policies domestically until 
2001 and explicitly in the Tenth and subsequent Five Year Plans that take climate change into 
account by encouraging the adoption of measures with co-benefits, such as encouraging energy 
conservation and efficiency (Stensdal 2012:6; Lewis 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008; 
Gupta and Yip 2014). This policy has taken place against the background of the recent 
transition of China from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy. 
In the last two decades, China has adopted a series of laws, plans, and policies on electricity, 
energy, the circular economy, and the environment. China’s energy policy is governed by the 
State Economic and Trade Commission, while oil policies are executed by different state 
enterprises such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(Sinopec). China appears to have a two pronged strategy – it not only invests in fossil fuels at 
home and abroad, it also heavily invests in renewable energy, thereby reducing the percentage 
of fossil fuels in its domestic energy mix (Jiang 2010). In 2016, China both signed and ratified 
the Paris Agreement and committed to a global 1.5-2°C goal. China’s Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDC) to climate change commits the country to reducing its GHG 
emissions per unit of GDP by 60-65% in 2030 compared to 2005 levels (Government of China 
2015). Towards this end, China is not only investing in a change in the supply side, but also in 
the demand side of energy by promoting ‘low-carbon lives’ and ‘low-carbon days’ (Gupta 
2014).  
3.3 China’s International Oil Companies abroad 
As part of its overall energy and geopolitical strategies, China – through the CNPC – first 
began importing oil from Peru in 1973. Throughout the 1990s, China more aggressively 
imported oil as China’s oil companies became increasingly global. Since 2010, the production 
and consumption levels of Chinese oil companies have exceeded that of all other producing 
regions individually (de Graaf 2014). This growth occurred in four stages: (a) the stage of 
importation (1970-1993); (b) the stage of hesitant foreign investment by Chinese national oil 
companies (NOCs) during which these companies often were welcomed (1993-2001); (c) the 
stage of WTO membership and an increased reliance on oil imports and the need for oil 
security in a more pronounced strategy to encourage foreign investment in oil in the tenth Five 
Year Plan (2001-2009). This was a complex period as host countries extract only as much oil 
and gas as they need for their economic goals. Therefore as oil prices rise, oil rich countries 
were willing to level off extraction, which pushed Chinese companies to invest in 
industrialized countries; and finally, (d) the stage of leadership in global oil production, 
consumption, and refinement (2009 onwards). Given this trajectory, we argue that with 
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continued transnational oil extractive behaviors, China may be left with a fifth phase of falling 
oil prices, phase out of oil demands, and stranded assets.  
Due to limited domestic sources, China has invested heavily in oil exploration abroad. China is 
now the world’s second largest oil consumer and the largest oil importer. Chinese oil 
investments in Iran and Iraq are mostly service contracts that are profitable financially when 
the politics permit, but do not ensure China’s energy security as these contracts do not permit 
oil exports to China (Dong 2014). China is also in the process of investing in the Saudi oil and 
gas fields (Mo 2014), as well as having invested in Ghana since 2010 with a view on oil 
importation. However recent research shows that Chinese oil companies in Ghana often act 
independently of Chinese state interests and do not address the policy needs of Ghana. As 
Hardus (2014) notes, this “contradicts ‘China threat’ theories that portray China’s activities 
abroad as part of a highly coordinated strategy to take control of global oil resources” (Hardus 
2014: 608). Finally, China’s investments in Sudan pursue joint ventures that have led to both 
profits and social investments in the country. These activities pose both local political risks – 
exemplified when Sudan bifurcated in 2012 – as well as global political risks (Mo 2014).  
China is also increasingly investing in Latin America, although its role remains marginal there. 
In addition to investments in Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia, Sinopec is investing in 
Brazil and CNOOC in Argentina. Much of this oil does not reach China but is sold to the US 
(Hoogenboom 2014). Investments in Latin America run contextual risks because of social 
protests and political instability (Hongbo 2014; Hoogenboom 2014).  
Lastly, China is not only investing in Southern countries but also in industrialized countries of 
the North – it is buying oil investments in UK, Japan, Canada, and investing in Russia and 
Kazakhstan (Cutler 2014). Although China is investing abroad, its international oil assets are 
ranked as 98 out of the top 100 list of oil multinationals (Mo 2014).  
From these global trends, we can see that Chinese oil companies seek to (a) ensure the security 
of access to oil and gas resources which the country lacks (Holslag 2006; Moyo 2012); (b) 
provide such resources to other developing country purchasers (McNally 2012) such as 
through risk service contracts signed in Iran and Iraq; (c) increase access to oil and enhance 
their economic profits; (d) enhance profits only (cf. Dong 2014); and (e) improve access to 
technologies (Cutler 2014). As the example from Ghana illustrates, Chinese state-owned 
companies are to some extent controlled by the state and to some extent gradually becoming 
autonomous of the state.   
In light of these trends, the practice of oil extraction by Chinese multinationals has some 
curious characteristics. First, these companies tend to concentrate their activities in fragile 
states and have a higher tolerance for investing in situations of high political risk. This may be 
attributed to state subsidy and state policy (Dong 2014), but is also because as a newcomer 
with little prior experience, they are unable to enter more stable political contexts (Mo 2014). 
Second, many of the actual contracts do not permit oil exports to China, but imply only service 
delivery within the host country (Dong 2014). China’s contracts with Iraq are buy-back 
contracts, while Iran maintains its control of the resources as Chinese companies encounter 
different exploratory risks and extraction costs. From the moment of production, the Iranian 
government takes over but provides minor compensation to Chinese companies. In this case, 
Chinese companies are neither in charge nor shareholders in these companies – they make 
commercial gains but cannot export back to China. Third, some contracts actually lead to 
selling the oil to third-party countries (including to industrialized nations), and do not really 
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serve the energy security needs of China (Hoogenboom 2014). Fourth, as De Graaf (2014) 
argues, many Chinese state companies do not necessarily compete with domestic and other oil 
companies as they often collaborate with or have investments in many of them. 
3.4 Implications for geo-ecological risks  
In relation to the key theoretical storylines, we can argue that first, China’s gross high emission 
level has put it in the lime-light. The need for China to phase out fossil fuels is urgent because 
of its huge impact on global emissions levels. Second, clearly China has a right to development 
and energy security and therefore its oil companies have a right to exploit fossil fuel resources 
for profit. However, while the profits from these revenues appear to be channelling back to 
China for short-term development purposes, much of these investments are not actually 
contributing to China’s energy security needs. Furthermore, exposure to the impacts of climate 
change might adversely affect China’s long-term development prospects. Third, new fossil fuel 
purchases and investments in other countries may actually lead to stranded assets either at 
home or in the host country and a reduction in long-term returns on investment. These are 
some of the possible risks China faces.   
 
4. Newcomers to Development: OPEC and Nigeria 
4.1 Introduction 
In addition to the emerging economies like China, the global South encompasses the oil rich 
countries that have been exporting oil as a member of OPEC. OPEC, founded in 1960, aims 
“to coordinate and unify petroleum policies of its member countries and ensure stabilization of 
oil markets to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a 
steady income to producers and a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum 
industry” (Statute OPEC 2012, Article 2). OPEC currently has twelve Member Countries, 
Nigeria among them, which joined in 1971. Some OPEC members like Kuwait, Qatar, and the 
United Arab Emirates have incomes today comparable to that of industrialized countries, 
which was not the case in the 1990s. According to estimates, more than 80% of the world’s 
proven oil reserves are located in OPEC member countries, with the bulk of OPEC oil reserves 
in the Middle East, accounting for 66% of the OPEC total.5 The economies of OPEC countries 
to a large extent depend on oil revenues, with oil accounting for 30 to 60% of GDP.  
OPEC’s role in the global climate negotiations has been controversial. Despite being among 
the richest of the developing countries, they have long argued for compensation from 
industrialized nations if they were to phase out their oil production facilities under Article 4.8 
and 4.9 of the Climate Convention (Barnett and Dessai 2002; Gupta 2014). They have 
consistently opposed the adoption of emissions targets by industrialized countries, fearing that 
this will affect their oil income. At the same time, since industrialized countries have found 
alternative sources of oil and gas, their dependence on the Middle East has substantially 
decreased. Oil prices – which were expected to go up as a result of the rising demand of the 
emerging economies – are now at an all-time low as the market is saturated. Therefore there 
remain questions around whether OPEC will use its oil revenues to diversify its economies 
5 Source: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm.  
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(Barnett 2008). This section focuses on Nigeria, an OPEC country with middle income 
developing country status, first discussing its climate policy and then the situation with regard 
to oil investments in Nigeria.   
4.2 Nigeria’s Climate Change Policy 
Nigeria contributes minimally to GHG emissions, which in 2000 amounted to about 330,946 
gigatons (FGN 2010). On a per capita basis, the country’s emissions in 2011 were 0.5 metric 
tons (WB data, 2011), compared to 10.1 metric tons per capita in the Netherlands, 17 metric 
tons per capita in the United States, 6.7 metric tons per capita in China, and 1.7 metric tons per 
capita in India. Similar to other developing countries, Nigeria is highly susceptible to climate 
variability and change, and is already experiencing impacts such as desertification in the North 
and increased flooding in the Niger Delta, of which large parts are below sea level.  Climate 
change is projected to result in a loss in GDP of between 6% and 30% by 2050 (FGN 2010). In 
response, the national policy on climate change focuses on building institutional capacity, 
promoting an enabling environment for climate change policy, participating in global 
initiatives, investing in climate change science and technology, promoting research and 
development, increasing public awareness, and mobilizing communities for climate change 
adaptation measures (FGN 2012).  
In the run up to the Paris Conference of the Parties, the Nigerian government’s Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) aimed at peaking national carbon emissions by 
2030, reducing overall carbon intensity by 50% of 2005 levels, realizing 30% energy 
efficiency, and eliminating gas flaring and the capture of gas nationwide (Uwaegbulam 2015). 
Nigeria has yet to ratify the Paris Agreement.  
4.3 Nigeria and oil 
The country discovered oil in commercial quantities in 1956, and has been an oil-producing 
nation since 1958, joining OPEC in 1971 (EIA 2015b). As of January 2015, Nigeria has an 
estimated 37 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves, which is the second-largest amount in 
Africa after Libya. Nigeria also has an estimated 180 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas 
reserves (as of 2015), making Nigeria the largest natural gas reserve holder in Africa and the 
ninth largest in the world. Unlike most OPEC member countries, the oil industry accounts for 
only 14% of Nigeria’s GDP, but it constitutes 95% of export revenues and 75% of government 
revenues from taxes on and royalties paid by oil companies (EIA 2015b). However due to low 
oil prices, Nigeria’s fiscal buffers – in the form of savings in the Excess Crude Account and 
Sovereign Wealth Fund generated when oil revenues exceed budgeted revenues – declined 
from USD 11 billion at the end of 2012 to USD 3 billion at end of 2013 (IMF 2014). 
Nigeria is strongly associated with the ‘resource curse’ theory, which posits that countries with 
large natural resource reserves grow more slowly than resource-poor countries (Sachs and 
Warner 2001). One explanation is that natural resources crowd out other export-led activities 
that are drivers of growth, such as trading and manufacturing activities. Other drivers of 
growth that may be negatively impacted (such as through neglect) include education, 
entrepreneurial activity, or innovation (Sachs and Warner 2001). A second explanation is that 
natural resource rents are easily appropriated, which leads to government rent-seeking, corrupt 
behavior, a failure to focus on pro-growth policies, uneven wealth distribution, and the creation 
of ‘predator states’ (Auty 2000). The high levels of oil revenues also means governments do 
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not need to levy high taxes, which reduces the demand for government accountability 
(Corrigan 2014).  
In Nigeria, within a decade of the inception of the oil industry, the previously dominant 
agricultural sector was nearly wiped out as the country’s economy became solely dependent on 
oil (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2012). The contribution of oil revenue to total government revenue rose 
from 26.3% in 1970 to 82.1% in 1974 (Frynas 2001), and it has been sustaining government 
revenues since then. While receiving substantial oil rents in lieu of revenues from non-oil 
sources, the government (including political leaders and statutory agencies) became corrupt, 
leading to poor governance, lack of accountability, and political conflict (Ite 2007). There are 
accounts of large sums of money being transferred abroad (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2012):  
[T]he former head of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nuhu 
Ribadu, once likened oil theft – and the Nigerian state as a whole – to ‘organised crime’. 
He claims that in 2003, 70% of the country's oil wealth was stolen or wasted, this 
apparently went down to 40% by 2005 (with reference to Watts 2007: 641). 
Under the government of former president Goodluck Jonathan, some have noted that USD 20 
billion of oil revenues have disappeared, with some remarking that, “poor institutional quality 
is the real legacy of oil in Nigeria” (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003:15). Even though 
large amounts of oil revenues are benefiting ethnic majorities that live in non-oil producing 
parts of the country, much remains in the hands of corrupt elites in the Niger Delta and 
contribute to the continued uneven development of the region (Obi 2010). International oil 
companies, in particular, are implicit in corruption (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2012).6 According to the 
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), Nigeria loses an estimated USD 9.1 billion per year to 
oil thieves, while pipeline vandalism and oil theft have led to a decline in oil production from 
2.45 million barrels per day to 2.05 million barrels per day between 2010 and 2014.  
Nigeria fails to benefit from its resources due to a lack of refining capacity. Nigeria currently 
imports refined products, which are in turn heavily subsidized by the government and account 
for 30% of the total expenditure. Many argue that these subsidies fail to benefit the poorest in 
society (SDN 2015). Nigeria has high levels of poverty (around 35%) and high unemployment 
rates (24%) (WB 2013), with the Niger Delta being one of the most impoverished regions 
(Austine, Sunday & Raymond 2014; Obi 2010). Nigeria’s Gini coefficient was 48.8 in 2013 
(WB 2013) and its score on the Human Development Index is 0.504 (UNDP 2014a). 
Muhammadu Buhari, President since May 2015, is intent on eradicating corruption, 
particularly in the oil and gas sectors (APC 2013, Section 2). Section 12 of the ruling party’s 
manifesto concerns the oil industry, according to which the All Progressive Congress (APC) 
will “make the industry and Nigeria one of the world’s cutting edge centers for clean oil and 
gas technologies” and further develop the industry’s capacity to provide more jobs, put an end 
to gas flaring, and promote optimal domestic gas utilization (APC 2013). The APC also 
intends to pass the Petroleum Industry Bill as soon as possible, which supports these goals and 
reasserts the government’s bargaining power in the oil and gas sector. The Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) has already announced the need to renegotiate contracts with 
international oil companies to enhance government revenues. 
Practically, however, Nigeria faces continued dependence on oil revenues, which results in the 
lack of domestic energy security, the inability to effectively reutilize oil revenues to pursue a 
6 Kuijten, T. 2015, Interview 11, 14, 17, 21, 35 & 37. 
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low carbon future, and the inability to address impacts from projected climate change. 
Interviewees argue that the political rhetoric over the last thirty years has been about 
diversifying the economy, but which has not been implemented7. Another respondent argued, 
“if the country would no longer engage in oil trade, the country would grind to a halt”8 or “it 
would lead to civil war.”9 An energy transition would require support from the global 
community in the form of technology and knowledge transfer;10 however such support is 
unlikely. Nigeria needs to see to its own needs first and it should not be sacrificing its fate to a 
global problem it did not cause,11 and other developing countries should do the same12 as 
climate responsibility primarily lies with the large emitters of the US, Canada, and China.13   
Most respondents did not perceive the risk of stranded assets as a serious threat for Nigeria.14 
The government expects that the demand for oil will remain for at least the next thirty years 
and that it has an established position in the global market (EIA 2015b). Even though they 
have lost the US market, they still sell to the EU and India (EIA 2015b). Should Nigeria at 
some point be faced with a global phase-out of the oil industry before its reserves run out, one 
respondent argues that Nigeria’s strategy would be to increase the pace of extraction and rather 
than to sell its oil infrastructure.15 
Shell (Nigeria) is the IOC with the largest footprint in the country. SPDC (Shell Petroleum 
Development Company), a full subsidiary of Shell Nigeria, is the operator of a Joint Venture 
Agreement involving the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which holds 55%. 
Shell holds a further 30%, while Total and Agip hold minority shares of 10% and 5% 
respectively.16  
Shell notes a commitment to addressing climate change (Shell 2014). Since 2009, Shell has 
invested around USD 1 billion in researching and developing new low carbon technologies, 
which includes carbon capture and storage technologies, improving energy efficiency, and 
turning gas into a more efficient and clean fuel source (Shell 2014b; Shell 2014a). Shell 
advocates for a global price on carbon (BG Group plc et al. 2015), which is driven by profit 
and shareholder interests (Shell 2014a).17 Shell recently announced a reorganization to cut 
costs and refrained from further investments in a Canadian tar sand project (Shell Canada 
2015), which is no longer viable because of the continuous low oil price (EIA 2015a).  While 
Shell is well aware of the climate change problem, it thinks its investments in carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) and response to the market price of oil is the way in which it can 
contribute.18 The company rejects the stranded resources argument,19 and notes that as world 
population grows, energy demand for development also grows (Van Beurden 2014). Nigeria’s 
own population is expected to surpass that of the US and EU within a few decades. 
7 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 13. 
8 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 39. 
9 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 45, 57. 
10 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 23, 27, 39. 
11 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 21. 
12 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 9, 17, 19, 21, 28, 35 & 36. 
13 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 17, 19, 21, 28, 35, 36. 
14 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 19, 30, 32, 39, 42, 43, 45 & 58. 
15 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 55. 
16 Source: http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/our-business/bus-nigeria/e-and-p/spdc.html. 
17 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 21, 26, 30 & 48. 
18 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 29. 
19 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 29. 
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Shell’s position in Nigeria is highly contested as its environmental standards often do not meet 
international standards (UNEP 2011). For example, environmental degradation attributed to oil 
spills has led to the destruction of local livelihoods and general underdevelopment in the Niger 
Delta region. Communities have responded through protests and, in areas like Ogoniland, have 
resorted to communal violence to expel Shell (Obi 2010; Shell Nigeria 2015b; cf. Adunbi 
2016). Although the security situation has generally improved, the sabotaging of pipelines 
continues. The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) reported more 
than 900 sabotage incidents last year along the 12,700 km pipelines belonging to local and 
international companies. Between 2007 and 2014, the NOSDRA recorded a further 1,307 
incidents of vandalism (SDN 2015). Respondents from communities dispute this number, 
arguing that oil spills are often incorrectly ascribed to sabotage instead of technical failure.20    
Conflicts between Shell and local communities arise over the lack of job opportunities, lack of 
commitment by Shell employees to community development projects, failure to take into 
account community needs, and failure to provide for alternative sources of livelihoods after 
environmental impacts.21 Shell notes that, “one of the most important ways in which we 
provide support is by producing energy that also allows economic development.” However 
most of Nigeria’s oil and gas is exported, while the lack of access to energy for the population 
at large remains a major barrier to Nigeria’s economic development (Ibitoye and Adenikinju 
2007; FGN 2012; FGN 2011).  
Shell Nigeria contends that its main responsibility is paying tax and royalties to Nigeria. The 
company raises the question of whether domestic oil companies might take to heart domestic 
interests, more so than international ones. Nigeria is an interesting test case as the SPDC has 
been divesting onshore since 2010, selling off several oil mining licenses allegedly because of 
a reorientation of strategy and the government encouraging growth of Nigerian companies in 
the upstream oil and gas sector. By the end of 2014, close to one-third of Nigeria's crude oil 
reserves were in the hands of indigenous independent companies.22 Recently conducted 
preliminary research on the performance of domestic oil companies (SDN 2015) indicates that 
the pipeline security for domestic operations is better, but this might be simply because local 
communities know that sabotaging will yield less results as domestic companies have smaller 
budgets (SDN 2015). The same research finds that domestic companies tend to have a greater 
understanding of the Niger Delta communities and a more proactive approach to engagement 
(SDN 2015). 
These divestment trends are welcomed by the Department of Petroleum Resources – which is 
the regulatory arm of the Nigerian Ministry of Petroleum Resources – as a positive 
development for local capacity building,23 but others express serious concerns. For example, 
some suggest that this is only a matter of ‘fronting’ as international companies remain in 
charge in an attempt to continue to operate out of sight from public scrutiny.24 Some argue that 
international companies evade liability for unresolved environmental pollution, leaving it to 
domestic companies that do not have the financial resources to deal with such legacy issues.25 
Finally, others note that domestic companies do not have the expertise comparable to 
20 Kuijten T. 2015. Interview 15, 26, 27, 34, 35, 36, 3, 39, 45, 47, 57 & 63.. 
21 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 15, 19, 26, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38 & 39. 
22 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 20. 
23 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 20. 
24 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 22, 57. 
25 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 9. 
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international companies, so they are likely to be operating according to less stringent standards. 
At the same time, however, domestic companies are more likely to be able to operate below 
the radar, out of sight from the global community26, unlike Shell that is affected by 
international exposure, exemplified by recent court cases in the UK (settled) and in The Hague 
(appeal on-going) on the liability of Shell in terms of damages caused by oil spills from its 
operations (Shell Nigeria 2013; 2015a).  
4.4 Implications for geo-ecological risks  
In relation to our three theoretical storylines (see 2), we conclude first that Nigeria and other 
OPEC countries have long been under pressure from the international community to take 
action to reduce emissions. While these countries have asked for compensation for phasing out 
oil since 1992 under the Climate Convention, this has not been honored. Second, while Nigeria 
could claim that under its right to development it can continue to use this oil, empirical 
evidence shows that while oil extraction has indeed contributed to its national income, it has 
not led to balanced patterns of development across the different sectors of the country and has 
made Nigeria an export economy as opposed to have met domestic energy security needs. Oil 
politics has not created the jobs expected, has enhanced local conflict, and has exacerbated 
local pollution. This reduces the legitimacy of its right to development argument especially as 
the resources have not enhanced Nigeria’s broad adaptive capacity to address the severe 
potential climate change impacts for its rapidly growing population. Third, however, Nigeria’s 
aging oil infrastructure implies lower financial risks from stranded assets in the future.  
 
5. Perspectives from Prospective Oil Producers: Kenya and Tullow 
Oil 
5.1 Introduction 
Apart from the emerging economies and OPEC countries, there are about forty least developed 
countries (LDCs) and another 80 developing countries. The UN General Assembly established 
the LDCs group in 1971 to target previously neglected and poor countries, and was expected to 
make special efforts to engage them in international cooperation and development assistance. 
Most LDCs have high poverty rates and as a result are very vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change. Since the 1990s, per capita and total GHG emissions in LDCs have been very 
low (although growing).  
Some LDCs have recently discovered oil and gas resources and see them as a way to facilitate 
rapid economic development. For example, East Africa recently emerged as a surprising 
newcomer to the global oil and gas market with oil discoveries in Kenya and Uganda and gas 
discoveries in Mozambique and Tanzania (KPMG 2014). While Mozambique, Uganda, and 
Tanzania fall into the low-income economy category (and have a LDC status), Kenya has 
recently transitioned to a lower middle-income status (as of 1st July 2015 – World Bank 2013; 
26 Kuijten, T. 2015. Interview 22. 
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2015a; 2015b).27 The following section focuses on Kenya’s climate change policy followed by 
a discussion of its oil politics.  
5.2 Kenya’s Climate Change Policy 
Kenya’s responsibility for causing climate change is negligible, representing approximately 
only 0.1% of the total global emissions.28 Kenya’s total GHG emissions – including land use 
change and forestry – are about 69.60 metric tons while per capita emissions are estimated at 
1.27 metric tons in 2012 (World Resource Institute 2015; European Commission 2015).29 
Despite Kenya’s rising macroeconomic status (Odhiambo 2015), 43.37% of the population 
lives below the poverty line (below USD 1.25 per day) (UNDP 2014b). Even though Kenya’s 
Human Development Index is estimated at 0.535 (UNDP 2014b), the country experiences 
high-income inequality – the Gini coefficient is estimated at 47.68 (UNDP 2014b) – and faces 
persistent food insecurity (IFAD 2015; World Bank 2015c). Kenya is also extremely 
vulnerable to climate change (especially droughts and floods) and has low adaptive capacity 
(Government of Kenya (GOK) 2007, 2008). Kenya’s economy is highly dependent on climate 
sensitive sectors such as tourism, livestock, forestry, and fisheries, meaning climate change can 
significantly alter economic development trajectories (GOK 2007, 2008). East Africa, in 
general, experiences a number of climate vulnerability ‘hotspots,’ including arid and semiarid 
rangelands and the Indian Ocean coastline (Thornton et al. 2009). 
Kenya’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) states that, “Kenya believes 
that the key factors in determining the fairness of a contribution [to globally reducing GHG-
emissions] should include historical responsibility and respective capability to address climate 
change” (GOK 2015). The INDC also states that, “Kenya is determined to continue playing a 
leadership role in addressing climate change by communicating a fair and ambitious 
contribution” (GOK 2015), pledging to abate its GHG emissions by 30% by 2030. Yet 
implementation depends on international capital, technology and capacity support, as over 
USD 40 billion is needed to realize its mitigation and adaptation contribution (GOK 2015). 
Kenya’s mitigation efforts are currently underdeveloped due to a lack of prioritization,30 
deficient market incentives and funding,31 and a lack of affordable technology.32  
To achieve the objectives set forth in Vision 2030, Kenya will adopt a ‘low carbon climate 
resilient development pathway’ as envisaged in the National Climate Change Action Plan 
(NCCAP, GOK 2013) and the National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS, GOK 
2010a; GOK 2015). However interviewees note that there is little to no connection between 
this low carbon vision and the current oil developments in the country.33 Interviewees see the 
low carbon development path as an unrealistic perspective as fossil fuels will not be phased out 
soon and other issues relating to poverty, health, and education are often prioritized over 
climate change.34  
 
28 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 3, 10, 11, 18, 23 & 29. 
29 Data of the Kenyan government estimates Kenya’s total GHG-emissions in 2010 at 73 MtCO2eq, from 
which about 75% come from land use (change), forestry and agriculture (GOK 2015). 
30 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 10 & 17. 
31 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 17. 
32 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 10. 
33 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 16, 26 & 28. 
34 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 3, 10, 18 & 29. 
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Currently, Kenya’s electricity generation is already one of the most sustainable in the world. 
Renewable energy accounts for some 80%, mostly from hydroelectric sources that depend on 
hydrological and climate variability and change (Kiplagat et al. 2011; GOK 2014). The 
country’s renewable energy potential in solar, wind, and geothermal remains largely 
underdeveloped due to inadequate domestic expertise and lack of investment funding (Awuor 
and Ouya 2014; GOK 2014; Kimuyu et al. 2012; Kollikho and Rivard 2013).35 Therefore this 
sector requires support from the international community.36  
5.3 Kenya and oil 
In 2012, Kenya became a prospective oil producing country with the discovery of significant 
oil reserves around the South Lokichar Basin in the northwest of the country (KPMG 2014; 
EIA 2015c). Tullow Oil has led exploration in the area and estimates that production could 
increase to over 1 billion barrels of oil per year (Tullow Oil 2014a). As of 2015, oil production 
has yet to commence, but the government is already working on a renewed framework to 
govern the sector.  
Oil discovery is celebrated in Kenya as a potential driver of prosperity,37 as a ‘resource for 
development,’ injecting capital,38 catalysing industrial39 and infrastructural development (Patey 
2014).40 New sources of fuel will also supply energy, spur rural electrification,41 empower 
marginalized communities in the Turkana region,42 provide employment,43 and create trade and 
commerce opportunities.44 New sources of wealth will enhance Kenya’s energy independence 
and security, helping to reduce imports from the Middle East (Kiplagat et al. 2011).45 It will 
also drive the goals set out in Vision 2030 to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing 
middle-income country with a high quality life for all its citizens (GOK 2007).46  
The issue of stranded resources and assets is not perceived as a real risk to Kenya’s oil 
resources (cf. Nigeria). Stakeholders argue that Kenya should be entitled to use its domestic 
resources as it needs to develop.47 Yet, the exercise of its right to development also depends 
upon the global community in allowing Kenya and other developing countries to develop.48 
Kenyan interviewees have little trust in industrialized countries, which is deeply embedded in 
the Kenyan psyche and emerges from a long history of colonization, past aid structures, and 
contemporary market regulations.49 Kenyans argue that the big emitters and producers must 
bear responsibility and make space for Kenya to develop and use its domestic fossil fuel 
35 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 8 & 10. 
36 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 8, 9 & 10. 
37 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 7, 8, 13, 14 & 15. 
38 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 13, 19 & 22. 
39 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 14. 
40 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 7, 17 & 34. 
41 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 9, 14, 34. 
42 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 17, 30 & 34. 
43 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 17, 30 & 32. 
44 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 17. 
45 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 3. 
46 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 14 & 7. 
47 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 9, 13, 18, 19, 25, 26, 29 & 33.  
48 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 7 & 15. 
49 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 11 & 15. 
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resources.50 Kenyan interviewees also pointed out that the majority of companies engaged in 
exploration activities in Kenya are from the industrialized countries.51  
Whether prospective oil resources will catalyze equitable and sustainable development in 
Kenya remains questionable. Key challenges include achieving accountability52; the 
persistence of a lack of transparency, particularly, in terms of contract transparency, revenue 
transparency, and the traceability of revenues (KCSPOG 2014)53; the ineffective and currently 
low levels of public consultation and civil society participation, which is required by the 
Constitution (GOK 2010b)54; a lack of adequate information sharing with the public55; 
uncertain benefit sharing arrangements56; a lack of a clear revenue management vision 
(KCSPOG 2014)57; and the low capacity of the National Environment Management Authority 
(NEMA) to safeguard the environment.58 In particular, since the production-sharing contract 
between the government and companies including Tullow are confidential, this could pave the 
way for “lucrative legal benefits for firms” (KCSPOG 2014: 32).59 There are also worries that 
Kenya could face a resource curse where the petroleum industry may capture the economy, 
partly due to a recent drop in the tourist, horticulture, coffee, and tea sectors (KCSPOG 2014). 
Finally, since corruption prevails in other sectors (KCSPOG 2014)60, such behaviors could 
spill over into the oil sector61 across the national and county levels (KCSPOG 2014).62  
Much like the case in Nigeria, another important challenge for Kenya is the risk of oil-related 
conflict as the reserves are located in the already insecure, climate-vulnerable, and 
underdeveloped semi-arid Turkana region dominated by rival pastoralist tribes with recurring 
instances of cattle raiding63 and local community tensions64. These conflicts escalated violently 
starting in November 201365, which threatened the traditional lands and livelihoods of the 
Turkanas, who received limited compensation and lack a specified framework for local 
participation (KCSPOG 2014). 
Tullow Oil, a UK-based company, is leading exploration activities in the South Lokichar Basin 
(Tullow Oil 2014a). The company “acknowledges the climate change science that 
demonstrates global warming is occurring’ and future restrictions on GHG emissions” (Tullow 
Oil 2014c: 44-45), and recognizes its own role in contributing to global warming and foresees 
increasing future control over GHG emissions (Tullow Oil 2014c). As a result, the company is 
currently working on a strategy to reduce its own GHG emissions and acknowledges the risks 
of stranded resources (Tullow Oil 2014c). However, it argues that there will be a “continuing 
50 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 3.  
51 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 12. 
52 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 29. 
53 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 20, 28, 29, 33 & 34. 
54 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 24 & 28. 
55 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 24, 27 & 28. 
56 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 22, 16 & 20. 
57 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 19, 21, 22, 26 & 28. 
58 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 26, 27, 28 & 31. 
59 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 27, 33 & 34.  
60 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 12, 13, 14, 17, 22, 28 & 29. 
61 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 13. 
62 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 13 & 26. 
63 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 18, 32 & 34. 
64 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 16, 29, 31, 32, 33 & 34. 
65 Bos, K. 2014. Interview 16, 29, 31, 32 & 33. 
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role for the conventional oil and gas industry for decades to come. Even if governments around 
the world take decisive action now, it would take years of investment to replace the installed 
base of assets consuming fossil fuel, at a time when energy demand is forecast to continue to 
grow significantly” (Tullow Oil 2014c).  
The oil exploration market in Kenya is dominated by multinational oil companies such as 
Total, BG Group, Africa Oil Corporation, and Anadarko Petroleum Corporation. The National 
Oil Corporation (NOC) is currently the only domestic company engaged in exploration 
(KCSPOG 2014), but it remains unclear how the operations and investments of the NOC are 
and will be financed from oil revenues. Kenyans worry that they may lose oil revenues since 
many IOCs active in Kenya use tax havens (Quinn and Ball 2013), such as in the case of 
Tullow’s subsidiaries that are registered in the Netherlands (KCSPOG 2014). Kenya’s Civil 
Society Platform on Oil and Gas fears that “export under-invoicing will likely feature in the oil 
industry” and that NOCs may not work in the country’s best interest as they operate under 
secrecy, out of the public eye and parliamentary controls, while working with corrupt 
governments (KCSOG 2014: 27-28).  
5.4 Implications for geo-ecological risks  
In relation to three theoretical storyline (see 2), we conclude first that as Kenya’s emissions are 
very low, the relative urgency for Kenya to phase out is probably low. This could be used as 
justification to argue that Kenya’s right to development implies that it can and should become 
an oil producer. However, lessons from the Nigerian case suggest that the discovery of oil may 
not lead to the expected tax and other revenues, development benefits may not be evenly 
distributed spatially, and Kenya may end up using this oil for export and not really prioritize 
domestic needs. And clearly, Kenya is very vulnerable to climate change impacts. Third, 
unlike Nigeria’s aging oil infrastructure, Kenya’s prospective investments will likely lead to 
more expensive stranded assets, especially if an entire oil-dependent infrastructure is created 
domestically .  
 
6. Analysis: The Geo-Ecological Risks of Oil Transnationalism and 
Extraction for the Global South 
There are no clear answers to the dilemmas countries face in relation to climate change and 
energy politics (Sovacool et al. 2016).  However, there are clear risks for developing countries. 
Throughout this paper, we have argued that – under the Right to Development – industrialized 
countries must phase out fossil fuels while the global South may continue to develop using 
fossil fuel resources. However, the global South’s right to development is restricted since 
usage of fossil fuels must be completely eliminated eventually under the Paris Agreement. 
Furthermore, this right to development is only valid if oil revenues are made available to 
governments to diversify and develop national economies based on renewable energy. The 
example of Nigeria highlights how oil revenues have led to both the resource curse and 
exclusive dependence on oil and gas revenues, which have contributed to reducing overall 
development prospects and promoting corruption. This undermines Nigeria’s right to 
development argument. The example of Kenya shows that despite the presence of international 
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oil companies in spurring development, the actual financial benefits to local companies and 
communities may be negligible (and further hampered by secretive contracts). A summary 
comparison of oil investments of China, Kenya, and Nigeria is found in Table 1. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
A critical examination of the case studies show that the right to development can only be 
justified if ecological and social impacts are also taken into account, and that the process is in 
line with more recent calls for the Right to Sustainable Development. This effectively limits 
investments in new oil and gas infrastructures across the board. As a result, as Chinese or other 
Southern oil companies continue to invest in transnational oil resources, these interventions 
become more difficult to justify according to either the right to development or sustainable 
development lenses. Finally, developing countries should be subjected to differential treatment 
since they are highly diverse in terms of both income and per capita emissions. Here one could 
argue that the right of Kenya is greater than that of Nigeria or China, but such a perspective is 
time sensitive given the urgent need for action on climate change.  
Bringing the diverse lessons from the different contexts and the disparate literatures together, 
we argue that if a country in the global South elects to develop its fossil fuel resources into 
fossil fuel assets, it will encounter five broad categories of risks, with ecological risks 
reshaping risks in all other categories. First, ecological risks include the direct impacts of 
climate change on these countries, including through sea level rise, change in rainfall patterns, 
melting glaciers and rise in temperatures; impacts on local air and water pollution from 
extraction activities as experienced in Nigeria (this is less so in China as its extraction takes 
place abroad); and indirect ecological damage to the economy, which further prejudices the 
availability of ecosystem services. Ecological risks also include the risks associated with the 
global community’s imminent decision to translate the Paris Agreement (2015) into a phase 
out of oil and gas resources, thereby incentivizing a complete structural transformation of 
national economies. Clearly, there is no guarantee that all the steps will be taken by countries 
to make this happen in practice, but given the amount of global attention to climate change 
over the last 25 years and the increasing number of extreme weather events with disastrous 
impacts on countries, this a strong potential likelihood.   
Second, social risks include the impacts of climate change on public health which is high in the 
countries where the oil extraction actually takes place; loss of employment opportunities for 
those trained for this sector and those whose jobs rely on fossil fuels, such as taxi drivers; and 
political resistance leading to social unrest and the risk of sabotage.  
Third, economic risks include losses incurred by the state as a result of social impacts (such as 
health costs, loss of jobs, social unrest, and security costs); ecological impacts (such as climate 
impacts, cleaning up local water, and air pollution, and the costs of phase out); institutional and 
legal impacts (such as costs of litigation and compensation associated with phasing out oil and 
gas extraction, or if countries have to compensate international companies for phasing out 
fossil fuels); loss of resources to the state, loss of economic growth opportunities as production 
and consumption systems are locked into fossil fuel use; loss of shareholder value and 
investment opportunities, which are often sources of profit for pension funds and bank 
investment products; and the costs of not receiving assistance for adaptation or having instead 
to pay compensation for possible adaptation costs of others. Another economic risk is when oil 
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companies buy existing oil companies or assets, they may be left liable for the costs associated 
with remediating past pollution caused by the purchased oil company.  
Fourth, institutional and legal risks include litigation and the need to compensate local 
companies when the state decides to phase-out; either policy freezing or international litigation 
and the need to compensate international companies for closing down their companies under 
bilateral investment treaties; or the hypothetical need to compensate other countries for the 
impacts caused by continued pollution.  
Finally, political risks include the dangers of investing in unstable economies; the risk of 
nationalization or other forms of commercial interference; the risk of countries breaking up as 
in the case of Chinese investments in Sudan; the risk of international sanctions actually 
preventing investment in the oil sector and suspension of existing contracts as in the case of 
Chinese investments in Iraq; and the risk of war leading to loss of resources when investing in 
geo-politically sensitive countries. A summary of the five categories of geo-ecological risks is 
found in Table 2. We have qualitatively evaluated these risks based on the case studies, but we 
see these risks as hypotheses for further testing in these different countries.  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE]  
 
In principle, the argument that the global South’s cumulative per capita income and per capita 
emissions of GHGs is so low that it may continue to emit only holds as long as the global 
community – as a collective – can still emit GHGs. But given that the global community has 
committed to stay within the 1.5-2oC target, the window for the South to claim their right to 
emissions is closing. This is in the interest of not only the global community, but also for 
developing countries that are especially vulnerable to climate impacts. Since China has ratified 
the Paris Agreement it is legally bound to the Agreement. Although, Kenya, and Nigeria have 
not yet ratified the Agreement, they have adopted Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDC) and have also morally committed themselves to a fossil-fuel free future. 
But for the sake of argument, let us assume that they stay outside the Paris Agreement – it is 
possible that these countries will be subject to sanctions in the future . Unlike the short-term 
nature of political trade-offs, the risks of stranded assets attributed to proactive climate change 
action are likely to be definitive and long-term.  
Under these circumstances, China and its multinationals must reconsider whether it should 
support the purchase of fossil fuel investments in other countries for economic – as opposed to 
energy security – reasons. By buying up fossil fuel extraction facilities and resources that are 
considered risky investments in the North, China may end up with assets that may soon 
become stranded. Although this is a speculative argument, one can imagine that if 
industrialized countries were to suddenly announce a phase out of oil and gas, the value of all 
assets would decrease drastically. It is more likely that European and North American oil 
companies will sell their assets before such an announcement. One illustrative example is the 
case of the chlorofluorocarbons (CFC), where the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer (1985) did not directly advocate for the phase out CFCs. Instead, companies from 
industrialized countries sold their units to the global South. The subsequent Montreal Protocol 
on Ozone Depleting Substances (1989) then completely phased out global CFC production and 
offered the global South a grace period.   
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The situation is different for OPEC countries. OPEC countries are simply relying on their 
existing oil infrastructure (though in Nigeria the off-shore deep-water Bonga project continues 
to be expanded), thus they already face the problem of stranded assets. For them, every year 
that they can still extract implies an additional year of income. However OPEC countries have 
failed to diversify their economies over the last 25 years despite their high oil revenues, and are 
unlikely to recoup resources as assistance for adaptation. 
The scenarios will again be different for newcomers to oil resources, including Kenya, 
Uganda, and Ghana. While in theory they may wish to exploit these resources, their use is time 
limited. These countries are then not only exposed to the problem of stranded assets in the 
form of fossil fuel extraction and distribution networks, but also in terms of the infrastructure 
and technologies that use oil and gas and the legal risks associated with compensating local 
and foreign companies that invest in or use their oil fields. Finally, in addition to risks to 
countries, stranded assets also result in the loss of revenue if policy leads to closure of plants or 
non-implementation of contracts. This may subsequently lead to employee dissatisfaction; 
possible liability suits and the need to pay compensation to those who may suffer the impacts 
of climate change; and fall in share prices leading to a collapse of the company.   
While some argue that large Western multinationals behave as if there is no end to oil in sight, 
there are in fact two possible scenarios here: They may be doing this because of the inherent 
inertia within an oil company to continue to take on new investments and their conviction that 
they are too big to fail, but this may pose a very big risk for them. They may also only be 
making symbolic investments in new oil while secretly divesting their other holdings in order 
to recoup any resources that they can.  
 
7. Conclusions: The Right to Development Revisited  
Developing countries claim a right to development. This paper assessed whether investing in 
fossil fuels at home or abroad actually enhances the energy, resource, and developmental 
security of developing countries. We find that with the entry into force of the Paris Agreement 
and the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, the geo-ecological risks associated 
with such investments may outweigh their actual gains. Countries and companies often put 
forth counter arguments saying that they do not see the end of the fossil fuel era approaching, 
and hence the above geo-ecological risks are purely speculative. However, we argue that the 
global oil markets are in crisis – prices have already fallen – so industrialized countries will 
want to sell their fossil fuels assets prior to phase out mandates in order to extract some 
remaining sale value. Of course there will be fluctuations in this sector, but there can be little 
doubt that fossil fuels are destined to become obsolete within this century, and earlier rather 
than later, if climate change is to be limited to nominally safe levels.   
Global campaigns for divestment have noted that more than 500 organizations with collective 
assets of more than USD 3.4 trillion have committed to partial to full divestment. This 
divestment trend is clear across Europe and North America. For example, the Rockefeller 
Foundation in the US is divesting from oil,66 nineteen cities in France have agreed to divest, 
66 Source: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/22/rockefeller-heirs-divest-fossil-fuels-
climate-change 
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and the Bank of England is also seriously considering divesting. Russia is planning to partly 
privatize its state oil companies in order to share the risks of oil income, while even Shell is 
planning to sell off USD 30 billion in assets.67 In the global South, Saudi Arabia is planning to 
sell its oil resources to prepare for a non-fossil fuel world.68 These examples increasingly show 
that fossil fuel and technologies dependent on it will soon become obsolete.  
The opportunity costs and risks associated with leaving fossil fuels underground create three 
distinct challenges for global equity. These challenges have a significant influence on not just 
domestic fossil fuel policies in the global South, but also these countries engagement with 
other fossil fuel producing countries and oil extraction companies across the world. First, 
unexploited fossil fuel resources are unequally distributed across space, so there must be 
globally accountable mechanisms to determine how lost revenues from stranding fossil fuels 
can be equitably shared across countries. Second, the needs and capabilities associated with 
extracting the remaining fossil fuels allowable under a 1.5-2oC scenario are also unequally 
distributed. Third, to the extent that countries and companies invest in extractive infrastructure 
and technology to access these fossil fuels, they run the risk of encountering stranded assets 
when the global community eventually decides to phase out these resources. These three 
related inequities can be exacerbated by economic and geopolitical interests (Wolf and 
Tessman 2012) and create emerging paradoxes for global climate governance. 
The case studies of China, Nigeria and Kenya, and the subsequent synthetic assessment of geo-
ecological risks associated with stranded fossil fuel assets all point to a need for a global 
approach to monitoring transnational transfers of wealth and technology between countries that 
are permitted to extract fossil fuels, countries that are stranding resources and foregoing 
revenue, and countries that continue to require fossil fuel imports to support development (Van 
de Graaf and Verbruggen 2015). This global mechanism should be designed to account for not 
only specific place- and space-based political risks, but should also include evaluations of 
ecological and economic risks. Furthermore, there is a need for a clearer delineation of fossil 
fuel extraction responsibilities (i.e., between developed countries, Southern countries, Western 
oil companies, and Southern oil companies) that takes into account historical arguments of the 
right to (sustainable) development. The operational challenge then is to design a global climate 
governance arrangement that compensates losers, is perceived as equitable by all parties, and 
can impose strict limits on the use of fossil fuels in the long term (Jakob and Hilaire 2015).  
Having said that, no country will first agree to phase out oil and gas and then try to sell its 
fossil fuel assets. A country will first try to get rid of its assets at the highest possible price and 
then move towards phase out. Understanding this logic is critical for developing countries. The 
question to China is: under what circumstance should they enter into fossil fuel markets. How 
should China minimize the risks associated with stranded assets? Similarly, the message to 
Kenya is: what are the different approaches to minimizing economic and ecological risks of 
stranded assets through abstaining from investing in fossil fuels while simultaneously 
promoting renewable energy? Finally, the message to the OPEC countries is: diversify!  
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